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McKinney: Turning Orphans for a Profit: The Orphan Drug Act Is Due for an O

NOTE
TURNING ORPHANS FOR A PROFIT:
THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT IS DUE FOR AN
OVERHAUL
I.

INTRODUCTION: A DEEPLY FLAWED SYSTEM, DESPITE
WELL-INTENTIONED LEGISLATION

With a price listed at $71,306 per month, Myalept is currently one
of the most expensive medications on the American drug market.'
Myalept is used to treat patients who suffer from the rare disease
congenital or acquired generalized lipodystrophy, which is characterized
by a complete or partial loss of body fat? The disease affects
approximately one in ten million individuals in the general population, 3
yet Novelion, the biopharmaceutical company that manufactures the
drug, reported a net annual revenue of $71.4 million in 2018 for Myalept
alone. 4
Hypophosphatasia ("HPP") is a rare genetic disorder that prevents
the body from forming strong bones. 5 Those who suffer from HPP have

1.

Lauren Chase, The 20 Most Expensive Prescription Drugs in the U.S.A., GooD Rx (Aug.

Eric
11, 2020, 7:50 AM), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/20-most-expensive-drugs-in-the-usa;
Sagonowsky, The 20 Most Expensive Pharmacy Drugs in the US. in 2020, from Fallen
Blockbusters

to

New

Orphan

Meds,

FIERCE

PHARMA

(Feb.

14,

2020,

9:45

AM),

Myalept's
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/20-most-expensive-pharmacy-drugs-u-s-2020.
manufacturer increased the price by 9.9% in January 2020. Sagonowsky, supra. Patients typically
use fourteen vials per month and each vial costs $5,093. Chase, supra.
2.

Myalept Replaces Missing Leptin,

MYALEPT, http://www.myalept.com/how-myalept-

works (last visited Feb. 8, 2021); Congenital Generalized Lipodystrophy, NORD,
https://rarediseases.org/rare-diseases/congenital-generalized-lipodystrophy (last visited Feb. 8,
2021).
Congenital Generalized Lipodystrophy, supra note 2.
Novelion Therapeutics Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2018 Financial Results,
https://www.globenewswire.com/newsPM),
5:12
2019,
14,
(Mar.
GLOBENEWSWIRE
3.
4.

release/2019/03/14/1754886/0/en/Novelion-Therapeutics-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year2018-Financial-Results.html. In 2017, Novelion reported net revenues of $66.3 million. Id.
5. See Hypophosphatasia, NAT'L CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCIs. (Feb. 1,
Hypophosphatasia
https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/6734/hypophosphatasia.
2016),
("HPP") develops from a mutation in the gene that encodes for alkaline phosphatase. Joseph
Bennington-Castro, What Is Hypophosphatasia? Symptoms,

Causes, Diagnosis, Treatment, and
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bones that become soft or weakened, which causes skeletal deformities,
fractures, and pain. 6 Severe cases can be deadly for babies. 7 In x-rays,
their bones are nearly invisible.' Previous treatments for HPP were
generally directed toward preventing its symptoms until 2015, when
drug manufacturer Alexion introduced Strensiq, a medication that
treated the disease itself by replacing a user's alkaline phosphatase. 9
This groundbreaking treatment, however, came at a cost: Strensiq was
put on the market for approximately $285,000 per person annually.10
Yet, this exorbitant amount was perceived to be low by some analysts
who were expecting the drug to sell for an annual average price of

$400,000.11
Myalept and Strensiq are not alone: within the deeply flawed
American healthcare system, there is a disturbing trend wherein the
prices for drugs that treat rare medical conditions are twenty-five times
a
in
resulting
drugs,12
traditional
than
expensive
more
3
multi-billion-dollar industry.1 Drugs like Myalept and Strensiq are
life-changing for those suffering from rare diseases, but have the ability
to bankrupt these same people, as well as their employers."
Prevention, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.everydayhealth.com/hypoph
osphatasia/guide. Alkaline phosphatase is "an important enzyme that breaks down certain chemicals
and is involved in mineralization of the bones and teeth." Id. HPP causes the body to produce "a
non-functional form of alkaline phosphatase that cannot effectively take part in the mineralization
process." Id.
6. What is HPP, SOFT BONES, https://www.softbones.org/about/what-is-hpp (last visited
Feb. 8, 2021).
7. Id.
8. Neonates & Infants, HYPOPHOSPHATASIA, https://hypophosphatasia.com/hcp/patientcohorts/neonates-infants (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
https://www.magicfoundation.org/GrowthFOuND.,
9. Hypophosphatasia, MAGIC
Disorders/Hypophosphatasia (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
10. John Carroll, Updated: Alexion Wins FDA Ok on Strensiq, but StartlesAnalysts on Price,
FIERCE BIOTECH (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:53 PM), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/regulatory/updatedalexion-wins-fda-ok-on-strensiq-but-startles-analysts-on-price.
11. Id.
12. AHIP, Drug Pricesfor Rare Diseases Skyrocket While Big PharmaMakes Record Profits,
AHIP (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.ahip.org/drug-prices-for-rare-diseases-skyrocket-while-bigpharma-makes-record-profits.
13. Matej Mikulic, Top Global OrphanDrugs by Revenue in 2018, STATISTA (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/319274/leading-orphan-drug-revenues.
14. See Katie Thomas & Reed Abelson, The $6 Million Dollar Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases.html. Dawn Patterson
and her two children were prescribed Strensiq to treat their genetic condition. Id. Her husband's
union, which covered the drug's cost for the family, faced a potential annual bill of $6 million to
cover the family's healthcare costs. Id. The expected annual cost of $285,000 for the drug was
"based on the assumption that most patients would be children or infants and would weigh an
average of 50 pounds." Id. The actual bill for Ms. Patterson in 2018 approached $2 million. Id.
Eventually Alexion capped the annual cost at $1.5 million for each adult covered by Express
Scripts, a pharmacy benefit management ("PBM") organization, including Dawn Patterson. Id.
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The problem is well known, with pharmaceutical companies often
garnering attention for abusing their ability to raise prices of common
drugs and medications with few to no consequences. 15 In 2017, United
States President Donald Trump agreed that drug prices are too high and
declared that the pharmaceutical industry "is getting away with
murder." 16 Yet, despite the constant public shaming by the media, these
manufacturers continue to take advantage of a system originally
designed to fund the research and development of treatments for rare
diseases.17

15. See Shamard Charles, No End in Sight to Rising Drug Prices, Study Finds, NBC NEWS
(May 31, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-care/no-end-sight-rising-drugprices-study-finds-n1012181 (discussing a research study that found a large increase in prices for
commonly produced drugs); Garrett Johnson & wayne T. Brough, Big PharmaIs Abusing Patients,
and It's
Hurting Americans,
CNN
BUS.
(Sept.
13,
2019,
7:53
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/12/perspectives/drug-patents-abuse/index.htm (detailing how "Big
Pharma" spends hundreds of millions on lobbying and donations to keep drug prices high at the
expense of Americans who wish to require affordable treatment). At a hearing before the Senate
Finance Committee, top executives of several pharmaceutical companies admitted that while they
control the prices of commonly used prescription drugs, they could not commit to lowering the price
of those same drugs. DrugPricing in America: A Prescriptionfor Change, PartII: HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 19-21, 27, 29 (2019).
16. Katie Thomas, The Fight Trump Faces over Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/health/the-fight-trump-faces-over-drug-prices.html. In 2020,
President Trump issued four executive orders to make "medications affordable and accessible for all
Americans." Congress Didn't Act on PrescriptionDrug Prices. So President Trump Did., WHITE
HOUSE (July 27, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/congress-didnt-act-on-prescription-

drug-prices-so-president-trump-did. One of the orders bans rebates on prescription drugs paid by
pharmaceutical companies to PBMs for people who have prescription drug coverage through
Medicare. Exec. Order No. 13,939, 85 Fed. Reg. 45,759 (July 24, 2020). Generally, when a
pharmaceutical company sets the price a person pays for a drug, known as the list price, the
company may offer a rebate to the PBM, such as Express Scripts or CVS. Katie Thomas, Meet the
Rebate, the New Villain of High Drug Prices, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/health/rebates-high-drug-prices-trump.html. Health insurance
companies use PBMs to manage different benefits, including the development of formularies, or
lists of medications that an insurance company will cover. Id. Thus, a pharmaceutical company is
incentivized to provide these rebates to PBMs, as it is then likely the PBMs will include that
company's drug on a health insurance company's formulary. See id. Experts criticized President
Trump's July 24, 2020 order, however, noting that the rebates provided to the PBMs are usually
shared with health insurance companies and go toward lowering insurance premiums for seniors.
Victoria Knight, Trump Again Claims He's Bringing Down Drug Prices, but Details of How Are

Skimpy, KHN (Aug. 26, 2020), https://khn.org/news/president-trump-once-again-claims-hesbringing-down-drug-prices-but-details-of-how-are-skimpy. Thus, without the discount, premiums
are likely to increase for certain patient-consumers. Id. Additionally, Executive Order 13,939
provides that prior to banning the rebates, "the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall
confirm . .. that the action" does not, inter alia, increase Medicare beneficiary premiums. Exec.
Order No. 13,939, 85 Fed. Reg. at 45,759.
17. See infra Part II; Brittany De Lea, These Drugmakers Are Hiking Prices in 2019, Fox
BUS. (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/healthcare/these-drugmakers-are-hiking-pricesin-2019.
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Prior to 1983, pharmaceutical manufacturers were reluctant to
18
spend money on the production of drugs for these niche markets. In the
1960s, several drugs were linked to severely injurious side effects,
prompting Congress to pass amendments in order to ensure the safety of
drugs being marketed to Americans. 19 These amendments, however,
required pharmaceutical companies to undergo stringent drug testing by
way of clinical trials and a lengthy approval process with the Federal
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), ultimately making it more
difficult to obtain approval. 20 Companies halted the development of rare
disease medications due to the expenses needed to satisfy the new
requirements, coupled with the small markets associated with these
drugs.21
As a result of lobbying efforts by patient advocates and other
support groups, like special committees and task forces, 22 in 1983,
Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act ("ODA" or "the Act"), giving
these companies lucrative incentives to develop and research remedies
for these rare diseases.23 Under the ODA, drug manufacturers or
sponsors can request the Secretary of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to designate a drug as one used to treat a rare disease or
condition, thus granting it status as an "orphan drug." 2 The United
States government defines conditions that affect fewer than 200,000
Americans as "rare" diseases.25 To date, over 7,000 rare diseases have

18. Diana Kwon, How Orphan Drugs Became a Highly ProfitableIndustry, SCIENTIST (Apr.
30, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/features/how-orphan-drugs-became-a-highly-profitableindustry-64278.
19.

Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.

(Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/kefauver-harris-amendmentsrevolutionized-drug-development.
20.

Jeff Rum, Drug Pricing, a Complex Issue Affecting the Rare Disease Community, NAT'L

GAUCHER FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.gaucherdisease.org/blog/drug-pricing-a-complexissue-affecting-the-rare-disease-community.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id.; Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §@ 360aa-ee); OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
OEI-09-00-00380, ORPHAN DRUG ACT IMPLEMENTATION & IMPACT 4, 7 (2001).
24. 21 U.S.C. § 360aa; 21 C.F.R §§ 316.1(a)(1)(ii), 316.24(b) (2020).
25. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(A); see also FAQ About Rare Diseases, NAT'L CT. FOR
ADVANCING
TRANSLATIONAL
SCIs.
(Nov.
30,
2017),
https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/pages/31/faqs-about-rare-diseases. The definition of a rare
disease or condition also includes any disease or condition which "affects more than 200,000 in the
United States and for which there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and
making available in the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from
the sales in the United States of such drug." 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(B). While this Note focuses on
the issues that stem from orphan drugs that treat patient populations of less than 200,000 Americans,
it is worthwhile to note that on November 17, 2020, members of the House passed a bill designed to
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been identified in the United States, making these conditions not so
rare. 26 Instead, these diseases affect a total of approximately twenty-five
to thirty million people in the United States alone, meaning that between
twenty-five to thirty million Americans need access to affordable
treatments.27
Due to the ambiguous language of the ODA and its enforcing
regulation, the FDA's Code of Federal Regulations Part 316,
pharmaceutical companies have manipulated the Act, exploiting the
benefits to turn a profit for themselves 28 without providing the benefit to
the public that the statute was intended to remedy. 29 These benefits
close a loophole created by 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2)(B). See Fairness in Orphan Drug Exclusivity
Act, H.R. 4712, 116th Cong. (2020); see also H.R. 4712 (116th): Fairness in Orphan Drug
Exclusivity Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr4712 (last visited Feb. 8,
2021). Under the law as it currently stands, a company only needs to demonstrate the drug is not
economically viable for the first approval; to extend market exclusivity, the drug developer can
"piggyback" on the older drug's orphan status without having to show unprofitability again. Angus
Liu, Newly Passed House Bill Could Close Orphan Drug Loophole that Evergreens Exclusivity,

FIERCE PHARMA (Nov. 19, 2020, 12:11 PM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/house-passesbill-could-close-orphan-drug-loophole-evergreening-exclusivity. The new bill requires drug
companies to show "there is no reasonable expectation" that the research and development costs

will be recovered from sales of the drug in the United States in the first twelve years it is marketed.
H.R. 4712 § 2.
26.

See FAQ About Rare Diseases, supra note 25.

27. Id.
28. 21 U.S.C.

21 C.F.R. §§ 316.1-316.52 (2020); Troy Brennan, Manipulating
Act, CvS
HEALTH
PAYOR
SOLUTIONS
(Feb.
21,
2017),
https://payorsolutions.cvshealth.com/insights/manipulating-orphan-drug-act; see also Sarah Jane
the

Orphan

§§ 360aa-ee;

Drug

Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugsfor Rare Diseases Have Become Uncommonly Rich Monopolies,

https://www.npr.org/sections/healthAM),
4:59
17,
2017,
(Jan.
NPR
shots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies
(detailing a Kaiser Health News investigation that showed many drugs designated as "orphans"
were originally approved for mass-marketing or were designated as "orphans" for more than one
rare disease, which entitled the drug maker to the same statutory incentives and exclusivities
multiple times).
29. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Sky-High Pricesfor Orphan Drugs Slam American
Families and Insurers, KHN (Jan. 17, 2017), https://khn.org/news/sky-high-prices-for-orphandrugs-slam-american-families-and-insurers. Luke Whitbeck was two years old when he began
taking Cerezyme, a $300,000 per year orphan drug to treat Gaucher disease, a genetic condition that
affects only about 6,000 people in the United States. Id. His mother, Meg Whitbeck, described the
daunting uncertainty of the possibility that the family may need to pay for Luke's medication,
stating "we're not going to not treat Luke, but we're also never going to be able to pay these bills."
Id.; see also Howard Lewine, Millions of Adults Skip Medications Due to Their High Cost, HARV.

HEALTH PUB. (June 15, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/millions-skipmedications-due-to-their-high-cost-201501307673 (discussing a news report from the National
Center for Health Statistics, which found that about eight percent of adult Americans do not take
their medicines as prescribed because they cannot afford them); Micaela Marini Higgs, The High
Price of Insulin Is Literally Killing People, vICE (Apr. 5, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ezwwze/the-high-price-of-insulin-is-literally-killing-people
(reporting one case wherein a diabetic man died because he was fifty dollars short of reaching his
$750 GoFundMe goal to pay for a month's supply of insulin).
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include seven years of market exclusivity and tax credits for qualified
clinical trials.30 In many cases, these orphan-designated drugs are not
remotely isolated treatments for rare diseases. 31 Rather, data shows that
the FDA approves the orphans for multiple uses and pharmaceutical
companies mass-market them to a large population. 32
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
previously found that so long as a drug satisfied the two requirements set
forth in the ODA, the drug would be granted orphan drug designation
and exclusivity. 33 The drug would still be entitled to that designation and
exclusivity even if there was a non-orphan drug already on the market to
treat the same disease, and the would-be orphan drug did not
demonstrate clinical superiority to the already-approved, non-orphan
drug.34 Despite both the FDA and Congress attempting to close this
loophole in the ODA,3 5 a subsequent case, Eagle Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
v. Azar,36 has made clear that any drug that was designated as an orphan
prior to 2017 is not subject to the clinical superiority requirements. 37
This makes it likely that drugs similarly situated to the one at issue in
Eagle Pharms., Inc., or those drugs that were approved for marketing
but denied orphan drug exclusivity because the FDA found they were
not clinically superior to an already-approved product prior to the
enactment of the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017 ("FDARA"), will
now be granted seven years of exclusivity. 38
The even larger problem with the ODA as it currently stands is that
orphan drug exclusivity is applied only to the approved indication or use

30. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a), ee; 26 U.S.C. § 45C.
31. See Tribble & Lupkin, supranote 28.
32. Id.
33. Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 66 F. Supp. 3d 217, 220 (D.D.C.
2014). The two requirements are: (1) designation by the FDA as an "orphan drug" for use in treating
a rare disease or condition, and (2) receipt of FDA approval to be marketed to the public. Id.
34. Id. at 230.
35. 21 C.F.R. § 316.25 (2020). After the Depomed, Inc. complaint was filed, the FDA
amended 21 C.F.R. § 316.25 to provide that a clinical superiority hypothesis is required for orphan
drug designation where the drug is "the same drug as an already approved drug." Depomed, 66 F.
Supp. 3d at 236 n.12; 21 C.F.R. § 316.25(a)(3). In 2017, Congress passed the FDA Reauthorization
Act of 2017 ("FDARA"), which provides that if a sponsor seeks orphan drug exclusivity for a drug
that is the same as an already-approved or licensed drug "for the same rare disease or condition as
the already-approved drug, the Secretary shall require such sponsor, as a condition of such exclusive
approval or licensure, to demonstrate that such drug is clinically superior to any already-approved or
licensed drug that is the same drug." FDA Reorganization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, 131
Stat. 1005, 1049 (2017); 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(c).
36. No. 16-790, 2018 WL 3838265, at *1 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), aff'd 952 F.3d 323, 323
(D.C. Cir. 2020).
37. See Eagle Pharms., Inc., 2018 WL 3838265, at *3.
38. See Eagle Pharms., Inc., 952 F.3d at 329, 331, 341.
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of a designated drug.39 Thus, the same drug can be designated and
approved as an orphan drug for more than one rare disease and in some
cases, multiple rare diseases.4 0 For each additional designation and
approval, the pharmaceutical manufacturer is entitled to a fresh batch of
incentives.4 1 This also permits an orphan drug manufacturer to obtain
sequential periods of exclusivity for separate components of the same
disease. 4 2
The ODA and its enforcing regulations should be amended to
ensure that Congress's original intent is recognized. 43 Specifically, both
the Act and the regulations should be amended to prohibit the granting
of orphan designation to a drug already approved and marketed, even if
the new version is clinically superior to the already-approved drug.44
Congress and the FDA must act to restrict serial exclusivity by ending
drug manufacturers' ability to stack incentives. 45 Finally, the language of
the ODA should be amended to permit the FDA to revoke orphan drug
designation, and thus revoke market exclusivity, in specific
circumstances.4 6 Market exclusivity categorically decreases competition
and increases prices.47 If Congress and the FDA tighten restrictions on
when and how long a drug may be designated as an orphan drug, and
thus enjoy exclusivity under the ODA, competition will increase, prices
will decrease, and consumers-millions of sick Americans-will
benefit.4 8
This Note will begin by looking at the historical background of
drugs generally and the FDA approval process. 4 9 Part H will also discuss
the ODA's passage and detail the benefits currently enjoyed by drug

39. 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(b).
40. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 28.
41. See id.
42. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(b); see also infra Part III.B (discussing how drugs like Keytruda
receive multiple periods of exclusivity for different, but related, indications).
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ee; 21 C.F.R. pt. 316.
44. See infra Part IV.A (foreshadowing the solution set forth by this Note).
45. See infra Part W.A.
46. See infra Part v.C.
47.

See Avik Roy, The Competition Prescription:A Market-Based Planfor Affordable Drugs,

FREOPP (May 16, 2017), https://freopp.org/a-market-based-plan-for-affordable-prescription-drugs931e31024e08; Kelsey Waddill, Orphan Drug Act Raises Prescription Drug Spending, Needs
Reworking,

HEALTHPAYER

INTELLIGENCE

(Sept.

13,

2019),

https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/orphan-drug-act-raises-prescription-drug-spending-needsreworking (discussing a report produced by the American's Health Insurance Plans, which points
out that designated orphan drugs also serve common diseases, not just rare diseases, thereby
increasing the size of the drugs' markets and eliminating the need to charge exorbitant prices).
48. See Roy, supra note 47.
49.

See infra Part II.
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companies in the United States under the Act.50 Part III will discuss the
legal issues created by the ODA's incentives and detail the manipulation
of the provided benefits, as well as United States federal courts' and
Congress's responses to some of these abuses.51 Part IV sets forth the
argument that as a result of the extensive abuse of the Act, the statute
should be amended to eliminate any ambiguity and close certain
loopholes that currently exist.52 First, Part IV argues that the ODA
should be amended to provide that even if a drug is clinically superior to
an already-approved, non-orphan drug, its application for orphan drug
designation will be automatically denied, therefore prohibiting the drug
to benefit from any market exclusivity.53 Next, Part IV purports that the
Act's criteria should be revised to make it more difficult for a drug to be
designated as an orphan by excluding any drug that was previously
approved as an orphan drug.54 Finally, Part IV argues that the ODA
should be amended to permit the FDA to revoke market exclusivity
should sales of the orphan drug reach a certain threshold or should the
55
number of patients taking the drug exceed 200,000 Americans.
II.

THE STORY BEHIND THE ODA

According to the United States government, the terms "orphan
drugs" and "orphan designation" refer to a special status given to drugs
that treat rare diseases and conditions upon the request of a sponsor, that
in most cases is the drug manufacturer itself.56 These drugs are
considered "orphans" because they generally lack sponsors to develop
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See infra Part III.
52. See infra Part IV.

53. See infra Part IV.A.
54. See infra Part IV.A.
55. See infra Part Iv.B-C.
&

56. See generally Designating an Orphan Product: Drugs and Biological Products, FOOD
DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-

conditions/designating-orphan-product-drugs-and-biological-products (explaining the special status
given to drugs that are deemed orphan drugs in the United States today). Harry Shirkey, M.D., was
the first to write the term "orphan" in the context of therapeutic drugs in a 1968 editorial comment
entitled "Therapeutic Orphans." Frank J. Sasinowski & Andrew J. Hull, A BriefHistory of the Name

AM),
2015,
9:32
22,
(Feb.
NEWS
MEDCITY
Drugs,'
'Orphan
https://medcitynews.com/2015/02/brief-history-name-orphan-drugs. In his editorial, Dr. Shirkey, a
pediatrician in Birmingham, Alabama, discussed the inequality in the development of pediatric
drugs. Id. He argued that "[b]y an odd and unfortunate twist of fate, infants and children [were]
becoming 'therapeutic or pharmaceutical orphans."' Id. Following Dr. Shirkey's publication, others,
including Dr. Marion J. Finkel, began to apply "orphan" to other types of diseases that were
similarly abandoned. See id. Dr. Finkel served as the FDA's first Director of Orphan Products
Development in 1982. Id. Dr. Finkel started the trend of using the term "orphan" to describe drugs
and therapies that treated rare diseases. Id.
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them, due, in large part, to their costly research and limited profit
potential. 57 This Part will discuss the early origins of orphan drugs, and
Congress's response to a growing awareness that few medical treatments
were being developed for rare diseases. 58
A.

The Ebbs and Flows of Drug Development in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries

In the nineteenth century, pharmacy science was an experimental
process. 59 In 1848, Congress passed its first major attempt at drug
regulation: The Drug Importation Act of 1848." Throughout the rest of
the century, the United States made strides in protecting the public from
adulterated foods, including the appointment of chemists to positions
within the federal government. 61
The FDA was established by Congress on June 30, 1906, by way of
the passage of the Federal Food and Drugs Act. 62 This Act, to be
administered by the FDA, banned manufacturers from selling mislabeled
and adulterated products and from misleading consumers with false
claims. 63 It was mainly passed in response to Upton Sinclair's The
57.

FDA at Rare Disease Day/February28, 2011, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 3, 2017),

https://www.fda.gov/industry/developing-products-rare-diseases-conditions/fda-rare-disease-dayfebruary-28-2011. Drug companies themselves proffer the argument that ever-increasing prices for

orphan drugs are justified due to the high cost of research and development of these drugs. Shawn
Radcliff, Why Are Drug Pricesfor Rare Diseases on the Rise?, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 5, 2019),

https://www.healthline.com/health-news/critics-orphan-drug-law-ripe-for-abuse; see also infra text
accompanying notes 271-79.
58. See infra Part II.A-C; NAT'L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, TRENDS IN ORPHAN DRUG
COSTS AND EXPENDITURES DO NOT SUPPORT REVISIONS IN THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT:
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 1 (2017), https://rarediseases.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/NORD-

IMS-ReportFNL.pdf.
59.

See Drugs and Their Manufacture in the Nineteenth Century, CTR. FOR THE HIST. OF

MED., https://collections.countway.harvard.edu/onview/exhibits/show/apothecary-jars/nineteenthcentury-drugs (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
60. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 31, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/milestones-us-food-and-drug-lawhistory; Wesley J. Heath, America's FirstDrug Regulation Regime: The Rise and Fall of the Import

Drug Act of 1848, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 170 (2004). The Import Drug Act required the
inspection of any imported drugs by government agents in order to prevent adulterated drugs from

entering the United States. Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra. After issues with
its implementation and enforcement, the Import Drug Act was mostly repealed in 1922. Heath,
supra, at 176-78, 198.
61.

See Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra note 60.

62. Id.; John P. Swann, FDA's Origin, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/fdas-origin. At the time, the FDA
was still known as the Bureau of Chemistry-the predecessor of the FDA. Milestones in the U.S.
Food and Drug Law History, supra note 60.
63. Part I: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr.

24, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/part-i-1906-food-and-
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Jungle, which exposed the appalling conditions that workers in the
meat-packing industry experienced.` In addition to food safety, the FDA
65
is also tasked with regulating medications. Under Harvey W. Wiley's
tenure as commissioner of the FDA during the early 1900s, the focus
remained on ensuring food safety, which Wiley believed posed a greater
66
problem than potentially dangerous drugs.
Because of the numerous shortcomings of the 1906 Act, advocates
67
and the FDA itself pushed for a new bill in the 1930s. But it was not
until the new "sulfa wonder drug," Elixir Sulfanilamide, killed over one
68
hundred people, including many children, that Congress took action.
On June 25, 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Food,
69
Drug and Cosmetic Act into law. While the new law provided for
stricter labeling requirements and pre-market approval for all drugs, it,
too, had shortcomings. 70 Under the 1938 Act, so long as a drug
manufacturer followed guidelines used to determine that drugs were safe
for human consumption, the manufacturer was permitted to sell its
products in the U.S. marketplace. 71 However, during this time, there was
no requirement that drug manufacturers prove that their drugs actually
worked. 72 In fact, manufacturers could begin to sell a drug if the FDA

drugs-act-and-its-enforcement.
64.

See Upton Sinclair's The Jungle: Muckraking the Meat-PackingIndustry, CONsT. RTS.

FOUND., Fall 2008, https://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-24-1-b-upton-sinclairs-thejungle-muckraking-the-meat-packing-industry.html (noting that Sinclair's description of diseased,
rotten, and contaminated meat shocked the public and, coupled with unjust practices within the
meat-packing industry, led to increased public scrutiny and federal legislation).
65.
66.

PartI: The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, supra note 63.
Id.; Milestones in the U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra note 60.

67. See Part II: 1938, Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 27, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdas-evolving-regulatory-powers/part-ii-1938-food-drug-cosmeticact. Numerous products demonstrated the failures of the 1906 Act. Id. These products included
"Banbar, a worthless 'cure' for diabetes that the old law protected," and "the Wilhide Exhaler,
which falsely promised to cure tuberculosis and other pulmonary diseases." Id.
68. Id. The untested medication constituted a "highly toxic chemical analogue of antifreeze."
Id.
69. Id. The Constitution does not explicitly give the federal government any power to regulate
drugs and thus, Congress asserted its power to regulate interstate commerce to enact the law.
History of FederalRegulation: 1902-Present, FDAREVIEW.ORG https://www.fdareview.org/issues/

history-of-federal-regulation-1902-present (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
70.

Part II: 1938, Food, Drug, Cosmetic Act, supra note 67; Kefauver-HarrisAmendments

Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note 19; see Shawn Kennedy, FDA Kefauver-Harris
Amendment (1962), IMARC (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.imarcresearch.com/blog/bid/361199/FDAKefauver-Harris-Amendment-1962 (foreshadowing future amendments to the federal law as a result
of the deficiencies in the current law).
71. Kennedy, supra note 70.
72. Id.
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did not act within sixty days to prevent its marketing. 73 The FDA lacked
the authority to enforce some of the statutory provisions of the Act. 74
Over this period of time, the pharmaceutical industry began
developing numerous lifesaving prescription drugs. 75 Insulin was used
commercially by those afflicted with diabetes in most western countries
by the end of 1923.76 Commonly used drugs, like penicillin, were also
developed in the 1920s. 77 In the post-World War II era, the
pharmaceutical industry took off. 78 Different antibiotics were developed
to treat bacterial infections and illnesses. 79 In the 1950s, Americans
referred to new drugs as "magic bullets" because of how quickly and
effectively they cured illnesses. 80 The industry had transformed from
federally operated laboratories and non-profit research centers to private,
for-profit manufacturers who took the lead in new drug discovery and
development. 81
This led to one of the darkest episodes in worldwide pharmaceutical
research history.82 In the 1950s, the drug thalidomide was first marketed
in Germany as a mild, over-the-counter sleeping pill-safe even for
pregnant women. 83 It was marketed in forty-six countries and sales

73.

Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note 19.

74. Id.
75.

Jeremy A. Greene & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals-The

Kefauver-Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1481, 1481 (2012).
76. Michael Bliss, The History of Insulin, DIABETES CARE, Dec. 1993, at 4, 6. Sir Frederick
Banting and his assistant, Dr. Charles Best, discovered a synthetic form of insulin in Canada.
Frederick G. Banting, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1923/
banting/biographical (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). Banting later shared the Nobel Peace Prize in
Physiology or Medicine in 1923 with J.J.R. Macleod, who gave Banting facility space in which to
conduct experimental work in the field. Id.

77. 3 Drug Discoveries in the 1920s that Changed the World, RONDAXE (Sept. 12, 2020),
https://www.rondaxe.com/3-drug-discoveries-in-the-1920s-that-changed-the-world.
Penicillin was
considered a "miracle drug." Alina Bradford, Penicillin: Discovery, Benefits and Resistance, LIVE

In 1928, Alexander
SCI. (May 30, 2019), https://www.livescience.com/65598-penicillin.html.
Fleming discovered penicillin in Europe while he was investigating staphylococcus, a common type
of bacteria that may cause infections in patients with weakened immune systems. Alexander
Fleming, Sci. HIST. INS., https://www.sciencehistory.org/historical-profile/alexander-fleming (Dec.
5, 2017). The scientific community did not take notice of penicillin until a decade later, and Fleming
ultimately received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for the discovery in 1945. Id.
78.

History of FederalRegulation: 1902-Present, supra note 69.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125, 126 (2000).
(Dec.
11,
2019),
Thalidomide,
Sci.
MUSEUM
82. See
http://broughttolife.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/themes/controversies/thalidomide.
83.

Bara Fintel et al., The Thalidomide Tragedy: Lessons for Drug Safety and Regulation,

HELIX (July 28, 2009), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/thalidomide-tragedy-lessons-drugsafety-and-regulation.
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nearly matched those of aspirin. 84 By 1960, an Australian obstetrician,
Dr. William McBride, recommended the drug to his pregnant patients to
alleviate morning sickness, and in the process, he set a worldwide
trend.8 5
By 1961, thalidomide was reported as the likely cause for a large
86
increase in the number of disabled babies born in Europe. The strong
sedative properties caused so-called "monster-forming" children, where
limbs, and sometimes eyes, ears, and internal organs, failed to develop
properly. 87 By the end of the year, the drug was withdrawn from the
market. 88 By March 1962, the drug was banned in most countries where
it had been previously sold. 89
In July of 1962, United States President John F. Kennedy and the
American press praised Frances Kelsey, the FDA inspector who refused
to approve thalidomide for use in the United States. 90 Kelsey believed
that the drug's approval application was underdeveloped; there was a
lack of data indicating whether the drug could cross the placenta and be
ingested by an unborn, developing baby, and there were no results
available from American clinical trials.91 The thalidomide tragedy,
coupled with Kelsey's refusal to grant the drug's application, spurred
changes within the FDA's approval process in the form of the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments. 92

84. Id. The drug was not marketed in the United States. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes
90-92.
85. Fintel et al., supra note 83.
86. Frederick Dove, What's Happened to Thalidomide Babies?, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15536544.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Fintel et al., supra note 83.
90. Id. At this time, news traveled to the United States that thousands of children in Europe
had been born with "shortened, missing or flipper-like arms and legs" because of thalidomide.
Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note 19. Unknown to the

FDA, thalidomide manufacturer William S. Merrill Company distributed the drug to 1,200
physicians in the United States, including those who treated pregnant women. Id. In response, the
FDA launched a nationwide campaign to recover the drugs and President Kennedy issued warnings
to the American people. Id. In total, there were seventeen births of deformed infants tied to
thalidomide in the United States. Id.
91. Fintel et al., supra note 83. Approximately 20,000 Americans were given the drug in two
clinical trials spanning the 1950s and 1960s. Katie Thomas, The Story of Thalidomide in the U.S.,
Told Through Documents, N.Y. TIES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/health/thalidomide-

fda-documents.html (Mar. 24, 2020).
92. Fintel et al., supra note 83.
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1. Far-Reaching Legislation: Kefauver-Harris Amendments
By October 1962, the Drug Amendments of 1962,93 commonly
known as the Kefauver-Harris Amendments, were passed unanimously
by both houses of Congress and signed by President Kennedy. 94 The
legislation was originally introduced by Senator Carey Estes Kefauver in
1959, who believed patients were paying too much for their treatment
and were being misled by false advertising claims. 95 He advocated for
government control over drug safety labels and contents, and marketing
and distribution processes, as well as control over drug pricing and
competition. 96
Senator Kefauver led Senate hearings that discussed the ways in
which the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act could be strengthened
and eventually introduced legislation aimed at controlling the labeling,
marketing, and competition of drugs. 97 The proposed legislation
included a "scheme of compulsory patent sharing" where "each
pharmaceutical company would, after three years, be required to share
its new patents with competitors, while collecting an annual royalty fee"
of around eight percent. 98
Once the devastation of thalidomide became clear, Senator
Kefauver reintroduced his legislation, which was co-sponsored by
Senator Oren Harris,9 9 to include provisions that were designed to
prevent another tragedy. 100 The bill was also revised to remove the
pricing and patent-sharing provisions.1 01 Soon thereafter, the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments became law.10 2
The Amendments, inter alia, established a new process for drug
manufacturers to follow before receiving market approval and expanded
the FDA's authority. 03 Manufacturers must prove that their drugs are
effective before they go on the market and must report any serious side
93.

Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).

94. Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supranote 19.

95. Id. Senator Kefauver sat on the Senate Subcommittee for Antitrust and Monopoly. Id. He
was a democratic lawmaker from Tennessee who became a national figure in the early 1950s after
his involvement in the Senate's Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime. Estes Kefauver:

A Featured Biography, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
generic/FeaturedBio_KefauverEstes.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
96. History ofFederalRegulation: 1902-Present,supra note 69.
97. Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supra note 19.

98. History.ofFederalRegulation: 1902-Present,supra note 69.
99.

Harris, Oren, HIST.,

ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/H/

HARRIS,-Oren-(H000249) (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). Representative ("Rep.") Harris was a
democratic lawmaker from Arkansas. Id.
100.
101.
102.

Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supranote 19.
History ofFederalRegulation: 1902-Present,supra note 69.
Kefauver-HarrisAmendments Revolutionized Drug Development, supranote 19.

103. See id.
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and
must also produce "adequate
Manufacturers
effects.104
well-controlled clinical studies conducted by qualified experts" as
evidence of a drug's effectiveness. 0 5 Further, the Amendments required
the FDA to approve a new drug application within 180 days. 106 It also
provided the FDA with the power to control prescription drug
advertising, including a requirement that all advertisements contain
accurate information about side effects. 107 The FDA grew, increasing its
staff from 1,000 employees in 1951 to nearly 6,500 two decades later,
aiding in its ability to enforce the new standards. 10 8 Opponents criticized
the Amendments as "an excessive expansion of government power."109
Significantly, although the Amendments established new standards for
drug safety and efficacy, cost control measures were not addressed. 1 0
2. Neglected Patients: A Lack of Products to Treat Rare Diseases
From 1967 up until the passage of the ODA in 1983, the FDA
approved only thirty-four drugs developed specifically to treat rare
diseases." The stringent standards of the Kefauver-Harris amendments
made it more difficult for drug manufacturers to obtain approval for
12
drugs, due in part to the exorbitant costs of research and development.'
Over time, it was made clear that the "task of proving efficacy is much

104. Id.
105. See id.; see also Reid wilkening, The Price of Pills: A Brief History of the
Kefauver-Harris Amendment, PHAROS, Autumn 2019, at 17, 21. The randomized controlled trial
remains a significant tool for FDA investigations into pharmaceutical companies. Id. However, the
efficacy requirements increased the time necessary to develop new compounds, an unintended
consequence of the standards. Id.
106.

Kefauver-Harris Amendments

Revolutionized

Drug Development,

supra note

19.

Approval from the FDA was required before the drug could be marketed in the United States. Id.
107. Id.
108.
109.

Historyof FederalRegulation: 1902-Present,supra note 69.
What Are the Kefauver-HarrisAmendments?, INFOED GRANTS & CONTS. (Oct. 15, 2012),

https://infoedglobal.com/2012/10/15/what-are-the-kefauver-harris-amendments. Other critics argued
that the regulations delayed beneficial new medicines from reaching patients. Arthur Daemmrich,
Invisible Monuments and the Costs of PharmaceuticalRegulation: Twenty-Five Years of Drug Lag

Debate, 45 PHARMACY HIST. 3, 3 (2003). Additionally, between the early 1970s and the mid-1990s,
there was evidence that Europeans accessed significant therapies before Americans. Id. Further,
economists criticized the legislation and the FDA for valuing the prevention of marketing dangerous
drugs over Americans' access to life-saving medicines. Id. Economist Milton Friedman and some of
his colleagues found the legislation akin to a tax on drug sales that had virtually no effect on the
safety of the drugs. Id. According to them, "[T]his tax was spent on 'invisible monuments' instead
of on visible public health measures." Id.
110. Jay Hancock, Talk About D ja Vu: Senators Set to Re-Enact Drug Price Hearing of 60
Years Ago, KHN (Feb. 22, 2019), https://khn.org/news/talk-about-deja-vu-senators-set-to-re-enactdrug-price-hearing-of-60-years-ago.
111. NAT'L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, supra note 58, at 1.
112. Rum, supra note 20.
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more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming than the task of proving
safety." 1 3
The goal of the FDA's review process is to ensure that the drugs
that are approved are safe and effective for consumption. 1 4 First, a drug
sponsor must demonstrate the results from preclinical testing of
laboratory animals and explain its methodology to test the drug on
humans to the FDA." 5 The FDA then decides whether it is "reasonably
safe" for the company to move forward with human testing. 16 Next, the
FDA and a local institutional review board ("IRB") review the
application. 1 7
As a first step, the IRB must approve the clinical trial protocols."'
Phase I testing involves studies conducted with healthy volunteers in
order to determine the side effects of the drug. 19 Once it is determined
0
that Phase I was safe and acceptable, Phase II studies will commence.
Phase II emphasizes effectiveness and the goal is to "obtain preliminary
data on whether the drug works in people who have a certain disease or
condition.""' If Phase II reveals the drug is effective, Phase III begins,
and the studies become more extensive and involve a larger number of
test subjects-from several hundred to three thousand people. 12 The
researchers then examine different populations, dosages, and
113. History ofFederalRegulation: 1902-Present,supra note 69.
See The FDA's Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FOOD

&

114.

DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/fdas-drugreview-process-ensuring-drugs-are-safe-and-effective.
115. Id. A sponsor can be a company, research institution, or other organization that takes
responsibility for the development of a drug. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The institutional review board ("IRB") is a group of individuals whose purpose is to
protect the rights and welfare of human subjects that participate in research studies. Institutional
Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/institutional-reviewboards-frequently-asked-questions; What Is the Institutional Review Board (IRB)?, OR. ST. U.,
https://research.oregonstate.edu/irb/frequently-asked-questions/what-institutional-review-board-irb
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021). Under FDA regulations, an IRB reviews and monitors any research
activities. Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions, supra. Each IRB must register
with the FDA before approving studies if the study involves FDA regulations. Id.; see also 21
C.F.R. § 56.106 (2020). An IRB consists of a panel of individuals with varying backgrounds,
including non-scientists and members unaffiliated with the institution conducting the study. What is
the Institutional Review Board(IRB)?, supra.
118. The FDA 's Drug Review Process: Ensuring DrugsAre Safe and Effective, supranote 114.

Clinical trial protocols describe "the type of people who may participate in the clinical trial, the
schedule of tests and procedures, the medications and dosages to be studied, the length of the study,
the study's objectives, and other details." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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combinations with other drugs and produce a comprehensive study.1"3
Then, the drug sponsor applies for FDA approval. 124
Prior to 1983, pharmaceutical companies focused solely on
researching and developing drugs that could be mass marketed to large
patient populations, thus recouping their investment and turning a profit,
as the costs of obtaining approval were the same regardless of the
projected consumer market population.12 5 Drugs to treat asthma,
hypertension, and other common diseases were developed. 126 Drug
companies disregarded the market made up of rare diseases and
conditions. 22 The pharmaceutical industry as a whole was "concerned
less with research for the sake of research, or overall social welfare, and
was concerned more with making profits through rational business
decisions." 128
B.

The Passageof the ODA

By the 1970s, patients in dire need of treatment began calling for
reform, 12 9 and in 1979, the FDA and the National Institute of Health
("NIH") created a task force. 0 Chaired by Marion J. Finkel, then
Associate Director for New Drug Evaluation at the FDA Bureau of
Drugs,"' the committee recognized that these rare diseases, and the
people afflicted by them, were underserved.13 2 The committee
considered possible incentives that would encourage pharmaceutical
manufacturers to produce these needed drugs and therapies." 3 Because it
was such a widespread and diverse problem, the committee's report
ultimately called for Congress to address this issue.1 3 4

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Rohde, supra note 81, at 125-26; see also History of FederalRegulation: 1902-Present,
supra note 69.
126. Rohde, supra note 81, at 126.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. John Swann, The Story Behind the Orphan Drug Act, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 23,
https://www.fda.gov/industry/orphan-products-development-events/story-behind-orphan2018),
drug-act. By the early 1980s, some twenty to twenty-five million patients suffered from
approximately 5,000 rare diseases. Id.
130. Id.; NAT'L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, supra note 58, at 1.
131. Koichi Mikami, Orphans in the Market: The History of Orphan Drug Policy, 32 SOC.
HIST. MED. 609, 613 (2019).
132.

NAT'L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, supra note 58, at 1.

133. Mikami, supra note 131, at 613.
134. See id.; see also INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, SIGNIFICANT DRUGS OF LIMITED
COMMERCIAL VALUE 1-2 (1979).
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'

One case in particular caught the attention of Representative
("Rep.") Elizabeth Holtzman.13' A researcher at Mount Sinai Hospital
named Melvin H. Van Weort developed an effective treatment for
myoclonus, a rare neurological disease. 13 6 However, after approaching
agencies like the FDA and the NIH, Dr. Van Weort could not find
adequate funding to produce the chemical compound needed for the
treatment.137 One of Dr. Van Weort's patients, Sharon Dobkin, contacted
Rep. Holtzman and convinced her that legislative action was needed.138
Based on the task force's recommendations, Rep. Holtzman introduced a
bill that would provide administrative and economic assistance,
including extensions on the patent lives of certain drugs and the release
of direct federal grants, to pharmaceutical companies for the research
and development of drugs used to treat rare diseases.1 39 To Rep.
Holtzman, the primary solution was a separate office to coordinate
research and development activities at the NIH, alleviating the advisory
board at the FDA who handled it at the time. 14 0 While Holtzman realized
"that no single piece of legislation [would] be able to solve all the
issues," she contended that her "bill [would] provide an administrative
framework." 4
At a June 1980 hearing held by the Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment, Rep. Holtzman identified Sharon Dobkin to members
of the Subcommittee, noting "[t]he basic problem is clear."1 42 "Certain
drugs and chemical compounds," she continued, "already identified, are
not being produced simply because they are unprofitable."'4 3 Although
these drugs have a "limited commercial value," they have an
"incalculable value to the afflicted patients and their families."144 Rep.

135. ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN & CYNTHIA L. COOPER, WHO SAID IT WOULD BE EASY?: ONE
WOMAN'S LIFE IN THE POLITICAL ARENA 106-07 (1996); see also Mikami, supra note 131, at 616.

Rep. Holtzman was a Democratic congresswoman from New York. Holtzman, Elizabeth, HIST.,
ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/15213?ret=True (last visited Feb. 8,
2021). She was "a self-proclaimed political outsider" who earned national prominence as an active
member of the Judiciary Committee during President Nixon's impeachment inquiry and as a
cofounder of the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues. Id.
136. Mikami, supra note 131, at 616.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Volume II: Drug Regulation Reform-Oversight: Hearing on How Can We Best Use Our
Limited Resources and at the Same Time Insure Safe and Effective Drugs to Diseases Which
Infrequently Occur Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Env't of the Comm. on Interstate and

Foreign Com., 96th Cong. 4 (1980) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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Holtzman's bill, however, did not pass in the House of Representatives
and soon thereafter, she lost her Congressional seat.14 Rep. Ted Weiss,
another democratic lawmaker from New York, resubmitted her bill in
1981.' Later that year, Rep. Henry Waxman submitted his own version
of the bill. 147 Finally, in January 1983, Waxman's bill became law when
President Ronald Reagan signed the ODA with the purpose of
encouraging the development of drugs for rare diseases.1 48
C.

The Law as It Stands Today

As originally enacted and as it stands today, the ODA provides a
pharmaceutical company with several incentives if and when the FDA
grants orphan designation to one of the company's drugs.1 49 First, the
sponsors of an approved orphan product are provided with seven years
of market exclusivity with certain exceptions.' 5 0 Second, the drug
company is provided with a tax credit for a percentage of the cost of
conducting human clinical trials.15' Third, the company is given federal
research grants to defray the costs of testing expenses, developing
2
medical devices, and medical foods for rare diseases and conditions."

Under 21 U.S.C. § 355, any drug seeking approval from the FDA
for marketing and distribution in interstate commerce must prove the
drug's safety and effectiveness by way of extensive and costly human
clinical trials. 5 3 An orphan drug, however, is entitled to a streamlined
approval process while it is still being developed, and under the ODA,
clinical trials involving human testing are not required.5 4 Instead, the
145. Mikami, supra note 131, at 617.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 609, 617.
148. Id. at 617; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ORPHAN DRUG
ACT IMPLEMENTATION & IMPACT 1 (2001).

149. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1988); 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (2018).
150. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2018). During this time, the FDA may
not approve any other application for the same drug to treat the same rare disease until seven years
have passed. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2018). Because FDA approval is mandatory for any drug to be
marketed, this effectively provides the first manufacturer that receives approval of such a drug the
exclusive ability to market the drug for seven years, thereby setting any price it chooses. See id. The
regulations define the term "same drug" to mean, inter alia, "a drug that contains the same active
moiety as a previously approved drug and is intended for the same use of the previously approved
drug." 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14) (2020).
151. 21 U.S.C. § 360dd (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 360dd (2018).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2018).
153. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b); see also supra text accompanying notes 114-24; Drug Approval
Process, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/media/82381/download (last visited Feb. 8,
2021).
154. OFF. OF ORPHAN PRODS. DEV. (OOPD), RECOMMENDED TIPS FOR CREATING AN ORPHAN
DRUG DESIGNATION APPLICATION 14-15 (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/111762/download.
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application must show that the drug "promise[s] to treat, diagnose or
prevent" the rare disease or condition.15 ' The data used to support this
scientific rationale "may include clinical study data, in vivo animal data,
and in vitro data."1 56 If there is no clinical data or animal studies, the
FDA will even consider an explanation of "what the data means and how
it relates to the disease" when reviewing the application.'
The Act also provides for exceptions to the market exclusivity
provision.1 58 The FDA will approve the same drug to be marketed if:
(1) the sponsor of the first drug "cannot ensure the availability of
sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the needs of persons with the
disease or condition for which the drug was designated"; or (2) the
sponsor provides the FDA, in writing, the consent to approve other
applications before the seven-year period is complete.' 59 Additionally,
an orphan drug is still entitled to market exclusivity, even if the same
drug is already on the market, if the sponsor of the orphan drug proves
the orphan drug is superior to the existing drug.1 60 These incentives
worked-there are currently 5,788 orphan drug designations listed on
the FDA's website.161

III. DRUG MANUFACTURERS HAVE TAKEN GROSS ADVANTAGE OF
THE ODA
The ODA was not intended to create enormous profit margins for
drug manufacturers at the expense of those suffering from the rare
diseases of which such medications were designed to treat.1 62 In 2016,
Animal studies or other clearly explained data may be considered in lieu of clinical data. Id.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 12. "In vivo" is Latin for "within the living" and it refers to testing on a whole living
organism. Jamie Eske, What Is the Difference Between In Vivo and In Vitro?, MED. NEWS TODAY
"In vitro" is Latin
(Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/in-vivo-vs-in-vitro.
for "in glass." Id. In vitro data results from laboratory testing and usually involves studying
microorganisms, human cells, or animal cells in culture. Id.
157.

OFF. OF ORPHAN PRODS. DEV. (OOPD), supranote 154, at 15.

158. See 21 U.S.C.
159. Id.
160. § 360cc(c).

§ 360cc(b).

161. See Search Orphan Drug Designations & Approvals, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021)
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/listResult.cfn
(showing the FDA search engine that contains every orphan drug designation that was approved as
of October 12, 2020).
162. See supra Part II; see also Mikami, supra note 131, at 611, 629. Mikami characterizes the
Orphan Drug Act as a market-based policy wherein the U.S. government sought to create market
incentives to encourage pharmaceutical companies to invest in producing new drugs, while avoiding
interference in the pharmaceutical market more generally. Id. However, the author also argues that
this approach has not been used as intended because pharmaceutical companies are using the
billions of dollars in profits from one orphan drug to finance products for other rare diseases and
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the average annual cost for orphan drugs was $140,443, compared with
$27,756 for mainstream drugs. 163 This Part will examine the two major
issues caused by the ODA.'" First, the ODA grants orphan drug
designation, along with the incentives that designation provides, to drugs
that are clinically superior, even if that drug is the "same drug" as one
already existing on the market. 165 Second, the ODA allows drug
manufacturers to receive orphan status for the same drug to treat
numerous diseases, thereby stacking the incentives the ODA provides. 166
Supporters of the Act, like the National Organization for Rare
Disorders, seem to ignore its downfalls, citing the number of orphan
drugs as evidence of the advancement in treatments and care for patients
with rare diseases.1 67 While it cannot be denied that the ODA stimulated
innovation for treatments, including gene therapies and cancer
treatments, it is also true that many companies have taken advantage of
it-gross advantage, many would argue. 168
A study done by researchers at Johns Hopkins University estimated
that sales revenue from orphan drugs will rise at more than double the
rate of the overall prescription drug market in 2020, with orphan drugs

raking

in a whopping $176

billion in sales.1 69 According

to

EvaluatePharma, seven of the top ten drug companies are global industry
players because of sales derived from their orphan drug products. 170 A
report produced by America's Health Insurance Plans ("AHIP") found
that from 1998 to 2017, the average annual cost for orphan drugs
increased twenty-six-fold, while the cost for specialty and traditional
drugs only doubled. 171 In fact, orphan drugs are being approved and

conditions, with no economic benefits to the patients. Id. at 629.
163.

EVALUATEPHARMA,

ORPHAN

DRUG

REPORT

2017,

at

4

(2017),

http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/EPOD17.pdf.
164. See infra Part IILA-B.
165. See infra Part II.A; 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14) (2020).
166. See infra Part III.B.
167.

See NAT'L ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, supra note 58, at 3. The high number of orphan

drug approvals reflects a commitment by the FDA to encourage development of orphan drugs and
the success of the Orphan Drug Act ("ODA") generally. Diane Dorman, Don't Let the Maker of a
STAT (May 28, 2019),
the Orphan Drug Act,
Buprenorphine Drug Abuse
https://www.statnews.com/2019/05/28/buprenorphine-drug-abusing-orphan-drug-act. However, the
loopholes within the Act, which are frequently exploited by drug manufacturers, threaten the
integrity of the ODA. See id.
168. Dorman, supra note 167; see infra Part IIIA-B.
169. Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission to Rare Diseases,
39 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 211 (2016).
170.

EVALUATEPHARMA, supra note 163.

171. AHIP, THE RISE OF ORPHAN
content/uploads/IBOrphanDrugs-1004.pdf.

DRUGS

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol49/iss2/8
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(2019),
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entering the market at higher rates than ever before. 172 Among newly
launched drugs, the AHIP report found that the share of orphan drugs
increased more than four-fold, from ten percent to forty-four percent
over the same twenty-year period.' 73
One of the most egregious abuses by drug manufacturers related to
drug pricing involves Turing Pharmaceuticals and its CEO, Martin
Shkreli. 174 In 2015, Shkreli's company acquired the rights to and raised
the price of Daraprim, an old orphan drug mainly used to treat
HIV/AIDS, from an affordable $13.50 to an outrageous $750 per
tablet. 7 1 One can even find Shkreli's face in a Google Images search for
the term "worst people."1 76 But the situation involving Shkreli also
raised the question: How was he able to get away with pricing the drug
at such a high cost? 77
A.

The ODA's Barrierto Competition

As originally enacted, the ODA's plain language unintentionally
provided a loophole allowing a drug manufacturer to receive market
exclusivity for its drug-even if the same drug was already on the
market. 78
In Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services,179 pharmaceutical company, Depomed, Inc. ("Plaintiff'),
manufactured Gralise, a drug to treat the rare condition post-herpetic
neuralgia ("PHN").1 80 Under the ODA, Plaintiff submitted an application
to the FDA, requesting orphan designation for Gralise. 181 Gralise then
met the statutory criteria that entitled it to market exclusivity under the
ODA in that: (1) the FDA designated Gralise as an orphan drug, and
82
(2) the FDA approved Gralise to be marketed to the public.1

172. Id. at 1.
173. Id. at 4.
174. See Issie Lapowsky, Why Does the Web Hate Martin Shkreli? Let Us Count the Ways,
WIRED (Aug. 4, 2017, 7:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/story/martin-shkreli-guilty-securities-fraud.
175. Id.; Sarah Massey, Martin Shkreli: A Timeline of Events that Shook Up the
PharmaceuticalIndustry, XTALKS (Jan. 13, 2016), https://xtalks.com/martin-shkreli-timeline.

176. Lapowsky, supra note 174.
177.

See Meg Tirrell, Martin Shkreli's Legacy: Putting a 'Fine Point' on the Drug Pricing

Debate, CNBC (Mar. 9, 2018, 6:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/09/martin-shkrelis-legacyshaping-the-drug-pricing-debate.html.
178. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (1988); Depomed, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 66
F. Supp. 3d 217, 220 (D.D.C. 2014).
179. 66 F. Supp. 3d 217.
180. Id. at 220.
181. Id. at 224.
182. Id. at 220.
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The FDA, however, declined to recognize the exclusivity period for
Gralise. 183 Prior to Plaintiff's application under the ODA for Gralise, the
FDA approved another drug, Neurontin, for use in treating PHN. 184
Neurontin was produced by pharmaceutical company Pfizer. 185
However, Pfizer never sought or obtained orphan drug designation for
Neurontin for use in treating PHN. 186 By the time Plaintiff submitted
Gralise as an orphan product in 2006, Neurontin and generic versions of
Neurontin were on the market for several years. 187
The FDA argued that Neurontin and Gralise were the "same drug"
under the regulations because both drugs' active ingredient is
gabapentin. 188 Thus, the FDA proffered that Plaintiff must prove that
Gralise is clinically superior to Neurontin in order for Gralise to receive
marketing exclusivity under the ODA. 189
The District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed with the
FDA, however, and granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 190
The court ordered the FDA to recognize orphan drug marketing
exclusivity to Plaintiff for Gralise without requiring Plaintiff to show
Gralise was clinically superior to the already-approved drugs on the
market. 19 1 The court agreed with Plaintiff's argument: the FDA's refusal
to recognize exclusivity was contrary to the text of the ODA. 192 At the
time, the ODA itself did not state that Plaintiff was required to show its
drug was clinically superior. 193 Instead, Gralise met the two statutory
requirements to receive the incentives provided by the ODA. 194
The FDA argued that the text of the ODA at the time of the
litigation was ambiguous since the statute did not speak to "whether
exclusivity must be recognized when a drug is designated as an orphan
drug and approved for marketing but is the same drug as one that has
already been approved for the same disease or condition."1 95 As a result,

183. Id. at 226.
184. Id. at 223.
185. Id. at 223-24.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 224.
188. Id. at 225. "Same drug" is defined as a "drug that contains the same active moiety as a
previously approved drug and is intended for the same use as the previously approved drug." 21
C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14) (2020).
189. Depomed, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 217, 225.
190. Id. at 237.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 233.
193. Id. at 221.
194. Id. at 231.
195. Id. at 228.
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the court should defer to the agency's decision to deny exclusivity, the
FDA proffered. 196
In evaluating the case, the court applied the two-step framework
established in Chevron, USA, Inc. v. National Resource Defense
Council,197 and found the ODA unambiguously requires market
exclusivity when the FDA designates an orphan drug as such and has
approved that drug for marketing. 198 Specifically, the court found the
ODA "employs the familiar and readily diagrammable formula, 'if x and
y, then z."'1 99 As such, so long as Plaintiff met the two statutory
requirements and did not fall under the two plainly stated exceptions,
Plaintiff's drug was entitled to market exclusivity. 200
The FDA also set forth compelling, policy-oriented arguments in its
favor.201 Specifically, the FDA maintained that: (1) requiring exclusivity
for Gralise could allow Plaintiff "to cut off any new gabapentin entrants
into the marketplace, which has been wide open for a decade, without
and
of PHN";
treatment
any benefit in the
providing
obtain
conceivably
could
(2) "similarly-situated drug manufacturers
successive periods of exclusivity for the same drug, provided that they
obtained seriatim designations and approvals."2 02
The court was unmoved by these arguments. 2 03 First, the court
found that nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to
incentivize only one sponsor to produce a certain drug.2 04 The court went
so far as to suggest that "general market forces" serve as a possible
reason the legislature permitted this. 205 Further, the court proffered,
manufacturers before Plaintiff had the opportunity to seek exclusivity
196. Id. at 228-29.
197. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). A court is first required to determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842. "If the intent of Congress is clear," the Supreme
Court held, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. If the court in its analysis finds,
however, that the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific issue, step two requires the court to
defer to any agency interpretation that is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at
843-44. The agency's interpretations will be considered permissible by the court, "unless they are
arbitraryor capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844.
198. Depomed, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 229.
199. Id. at 230.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 233.
202. Id. at 234.
203. See id. The court acknowledged these arguments as relevant to the first step in the
Chevron analysis based on "the longstanding rule that a statute should not be construed to produce

an absurd result." Id. The court reasoned that, under precedent, "[t]he plain meaning of legislation
should be conclusive, except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." Id.
204. Id. at 235.
205. Id.
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and failed to do so. 206 Thus, according to the court, Plaintiff should be
rewarded with market exclusivity for manipulating a statute, designed to
produce therapies for rare diseases, because Plaintiff filed an application
for such reward first, even though the same drug had been on the market
for years. 207
Second, the court noted that this scenario would not arise if the
FDA had fashioned regulations to prevent such abuse. 208 In fact, the
court stated that "this result would only occur if the FDA permitted it to
happen." 209 The court suggested that the FDA could change its
regulatory scheme and require applicants like Plaintiff to demonstrate
clinical superiority prior to orphan designation. 21 0
The FDA, despite withdrawing its appeal, 2 1' doubled down on its
clinical superiority requirement, issuing a notice in the Federal Register,
stating:
In consideration of any uncertainty created by the court's decision in
Depomed, the Agency is issuing this statement. It is the Agency's
position that, given the limited terms of the court's decision to
G[ralise], FDA intends to continue to apply its existing regulations in
part 316 to orphan-drug exclusivity matters. FDA interprets section
527 of the [Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act and its regulations (both the
older regulations that still apply to original requests for designation
made on or before August 12, 2013, as well as the current regulations)
to require the sponsor of a designated drug that is the "same" as a
previously approved drug to demonstrate that its drug is "clinically
superior" to that drug upon approval in order for the subsequently
approved drug to be eligible for orphan-drug exclusivity.2 1 2

&

206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Michelle L. Butler, FDA Withdraws Appeals in the Depomed Case, HYMAN, PHELPS
MCNAMARA PC (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.fdalawblog.net/2014/11/fda-withdraws-its-appeal-inthe-depomed-case. The motion to dismiss the appeal was unopposed and was granted on November
7, 2014. Id.
212. Policy on Orphan-Drug Exclusivity; Clarification, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,888, 76,888 (Dec. 17,
2014). The regulations also state that "[u]nless FDA previously approved the same drug for the
same use or indication, FDA will not approve another sponsor's marketing application for the same
drug for the same use or indication before the expiration of 7 years from the date of' the approval of
an orphan designated drug. 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(a) (2020). In other words, an orphan drug will not
receive orphan drug exclusivity unless it is shown to be clinically superior to the prior version.
Eagle Pharms., Inc. v. Azar, No. 16-790, 2018 WL 3838265, at *2, *3 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), aff'd
952 F.3d 323 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Braeburn Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2019). The
purpose is to undercut "evergreening," or a company's ability to "[o]btain infinite, successive 7-year
periods of exclusivity for the same drug for the same use when the previously approved drug had
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Quickly thereafter, Congress passed the FDARA, which amended
the ODA to reflect the FDA's regulatory practice of requiring a
demonstration of clinical superiority.21 Currently under the ODA and its
enforcing regulations, clinical superiority is tested at the designation
stage and the exclusivity stage. 2" At the designation stage, the sponsor
of a drug that is the same as an already-approved drug "may seek and
obtain orphan-drug designation for the subsequent drug for the same rare
disease or condition if it can present a plausible hypothesis that its drug
may be clinically superior to the first drug."" Then, once a drug is
approved for marketing, the FDA requires the manufacturer to
demonstrate "that the drug is clinically superior to the previously
approved drug." 216 Once it does so, the FDA will recognize the
exclusivity period for that drug.2 17
A subsequent case, Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Azar,2 18 made
clear that despite the legislative changes made, FDARA and the
requirements of clinical superiority do not apply to drugs designated as
orphans and approved for marketing prior to 2017.219 Drug manufacturer
Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ("Plaintiff') produced Bendeka, its drug to
treat two forms of cancer, and requested orphan designation for
Bendeka. 220 The FDA designated Bendeka as an orphan product and
approved it for marketing, but denied Plaintiff's request for market
exclusivity on the basis that Plaintiff failed to show Bendeka was
clinically superior to an already-approved drug to treat the same
disease.22 1 Plaintiff challenged the FDA's decision, arguing that under
Depomed, it did not have to prove clinical superiority, and even if it did,
it met the requirement.22 2
The United States District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court and the Depomed court, finding that the
such exclusivity." Orphan Drug Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,117, 35,127 (June 12, 2013).
213. FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, 131 Stat. 1005, 1049 (2017).
214. Id.
215. 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(a).
216. 21 C.F.R. § 316.34(c). A drug is "clinically superior," and thus the drug is not considered
the "same drug" as the one already on the market, when the drug is "shown to provide a significant
therapeutic advantage over and above that provided" by an already-approved drug in one of three

ways. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3). This can be proven with a showing that: (1) the new drug has a
greater effectiveness as assessed by effect on a clinically meaningful endpoint in adequate and
well-controlled trials; (2) the new drug is safer in a substantial portion of the target population; or

(3) the sponsor can demonstrate the drug makes a major contribution to patient care. Id.
217. 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(3).
218. 952 F.3d 323 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
219. Id. at 326, 329, 342.
220. Id. at 328-29.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 329.
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2
ODA, prior to the FDARA, was unambiguous. " At the time the
decision was handed down, the FDARA was in effect, and the ODA
2 24
The district court
stipulated that clinical superiority was required.
it believed
because
found that Congress may have amended the statute
Depomed was wrongly decided, but was concerned that other district
courts might follow course.22 Or, the court offered in the alternative,
Congress may have believed that Depomed was rightly decided, and
226
chose to reform the statute in line with the FDA's policy prescriptions.
The court stated it would not engage in any such speculation,
however. 227 Congress expressly instructed that "[n]othing in the
amendments ... shall affect any determination under the prior
orphan-drug exclusivity provision." 228 Thus, the court found the 2017
229
In
amendment was irrelevant in its determination of the case.
the
to
prior
requirements
statutory
two
the
met
that
drug
summary, any
2017 FDARA does not have to show it is clinically superior to any
already-approved drug in order to enjoy seven years of market
exclusivity and thus, these decisions bar any competition the drug
manufacturers may have faced if decided differently.2 30

B.

The ODA's Endless Exclusivity

The previous section of this Part addressed the issues stemming
from circumstances where the same drug, produced by different
manufacturers, is designated as an orphan drug to treat the same rare
disease or condition. 231 This Section explains the issues that arise when
the same drug, produced by the same manufacturer, is approved to treat
2 32
different rare diseases or conditions.
The ODA provides that the Secretary of the Department of HHS
shall, by regulation, promulgate procedures for the implementation of
233
Under the
orphan drug designation and market exclusivity.
regulations, the FDA is entitled to refuse to grant a request for orphan

223.
224.
225.
2018).
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 326, 329, 342.
See id. at 326 n.3.
Eagle Pharms., Inc. v. Azar, No. 16-790, 2018 WL 3838265, at *10 (D.D.C. June 8,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
21 U.S.C. §§ 360bb(d), cc(d) (2018).
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drug designation for one of following four reasons 234 : (1) if the "drug is
not intended for a rare disease or condition";23 5 (2) "if there is
insufficient information about the drug, or the disease or condition for
which it is intended, to establish a medically plausible basis for
expecting the drug to be effective in the prevention, diagnosis, or
treatment of that disease or condition"; 236 (3) if the drug is the same drug
as an already-approved drug for the same rare disease or condition and
the sponsor has not shown the new drug is clinically superior to the
already-approved drug; 237 or (4) "if the request for designation contains
an untrue statement of material fact or omits material information or if
the request is otherwise ineligible under this part." 238
Under the regulations, the "FDA may approve a sponsor's
marketing application for a designated orphan drug for use in the rare
disease or condition for which the drug was designated, or for select
indication(s) or use(s) within the rare disease or condition for which the
drug was designated." 23 9 The regulations further state that the orphan
drug exclusivity protects "only the approved indication or use of a
designated drug." 2 4 Thus, the FDA "may later approve the drug for
additional indication(s) or use(s) within the rare disease or condition not
protected by the exclusive approval" and the FDA will recognize
subsequent exclusivity periods for "these new (not previously approved)

234. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.25(a) (2020).
235. § 316.25(a)(1). A drug is not intended for a rare disease or condition if:
(i) There is insufficient evidence to support the estimate that the drug is intended for
treatment of a disease or condition in fewer than 200,000 people in the United States, or
that the drug is intended for use in prevention or in diagnosis in fewer than 200,000
people annually in the United States; or (ii) where the drug is intended for prevention,
diagnosis, or treatment of a disease or condition affecting 200,000 or more people in the
United States, the sponsor has failed to demonstrate that there is no reasonable
expectation that development and production costs will be recovered from sales of the
drug for such disease or condition in the United States. A sponsor's failure to comply
with § 316.21 [which lays out the requirements a sponsor shall meet in order for the FDA
to determine whether a drug qualifies for orphan drug designation] shall constitute a
failure to make the demonstration required in this paragraph.
Id.
236.
237.
238.
239.

§ 316.25(a)(2).
§ 316.25(a)(3).
§ 316.25(b).
§ 316.31(a). "An

'indication' for a drug refers to the use of that drug for treating a

particular disease." Omudhome Ogbru, Indicationsfor Drugs (Uses), Approved vs. Non-Approved,

MEDICINENET, https://www.medicinenet.com/indicationsfordrugs__approvedvsnon-approved/
views.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). For example, insulin is indicated for the treatment of diabetes,
but many drugs have more than one indication, meaning there is more than one disease for which
the drug is used. Id.
240. § 316.31(b).
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indication(s) or use(s) from the date of approval of the drug for such new
indication(s) or use(s)."2 4 1
2 42
A
Taken together, these regulations permit shocking results.
seven
pharmaceutical company can obtain orphan drug designation and
243
Before its
years of exclusivity for its drug to treat rare disease X.
seven years of exclusivity end, the company can then obtain orphan drug
designation and seven years of exclusivity for its drug to treat rare
2
disease Y, which may even be related to rare disease X. 4 The
regulations do not limit the amount of times a drug company can proffer
the same drug for the ODA's incentives. 245 Instead, exclusivity may be
endless. 246
But the real abuse comes when the drug manufacturer, which has
stacked incentives for the same drug for the treatment of different
indications or uses, raises the price of the drug to an astronomical
amount. 247 Pharmaceutical company AbbVie has flagrantly committed
such an abuse with its drug Humira. 24 8 Humira was originally approved
in 2002 to treat rheumatoid arthritis ,249 which affects millions of
people. 2 0 Three years later, AbbVie requested orphan designation for
Humira to treat juvenile rheumatoid arthritis.2" AbbVie claimed that
juvenile rheumatoid arthritis affected between thirty thousand to fifty
thousand Americans, a figure within the threshold of the statutory
252
definition of a rare disease or condition.
But this begs the question: What is the difference between adult and
juvenile rheumatoid arthritis? 253 Some children with juvenile rheumatoid
arthritis outgrow the illness, while adults usually have lifelong
symptoms.2 5 4 Yet, the FDA approved this second designation in 2008.255

241. Id.
242. See §§ 316.25, 316.31.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugmakers Manipulate Orphan Rules to Create
Prized Monopolies, KHN (Jan. 17, 2017), https://khn.org/news/drugmakers-manipulate-orphandrug-rules-to-create-prized-monopolies.
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252.
253.

Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
David Zelman, What Is the Main Difference Between Juvenile and Adult Rheumatoid

Arthritis?, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/rheumatoid-arthritis/qa/what-is-the-main-differencebetween-juvenile-and-adult-rheumatoid-arthritis (Jan. 30, 2019).
254. Id.
255. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 247.
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AbbVie then requested orphan designation for the same drug to treat
four other statutorily rare diseases, including Crohn's disease and
uveitis, thereby extending market exclusivity and the other incentives
offered by the ODA to Humira until 2023.256
Many of the drugs with orphan designation listed on the FDA's
website are commonly known drugs, including Humira. 25 7 When one
searches for Humira on the database, eight entries are listed under its
generic name, adalimumab.2 58 Currently, Humira is designated as an
orphan drug to treat the following diseases or conditions: moderate to
severe hidradenitis suppurativa, moderate to severe Hurley stage disease,
Crohn's disease, rheumatoid arthritis, chronic plaque psoriasis, and
ulcerative colitis. 25 9 As a result of Humira's long-term market
exclusivity, Sandoz, Inc., a manufacturer of the generic version of
Humira, must wait until the beginning of 2023 to bring its drug to the
United States market, twenty-one years after the drug was first approved,
and once it does, Sandoz must pay AbbVie a royalty fee. 260 Thus,
AbbVie faced a complete lack of competition for nearly two decades,
enabling it to charge a premium for its drug-which rails against the
ODA's original purpose and resulted in AbbVie's global sales totaling

$19.9 billion in 2018 alone. 261
This application of the ODA is also seen in the oncology branch of
medicine. 2 62 Keytruda is a drug produced by Merck & Co. and is used to
treat cancer patients. 2 63 Merck & Co. currently holds exclusivity over
Keytruda for seven different uses, at least one of which extends to 2026,
and at least three of which are related to the same disease-malignant
melanoma. 264 Keytruda's list price for each dose is $9,869.94 when

256. Id.
257. See Search Orphan Drug Designations& Approvals, supra note 161. On the website, the
drugs are sorted by their generic names. Id. The generic name for Humira is adalimumab. Id.
258. Id.
259. Gale Scott, New Indication for Adalimumab, HCP LIVE (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.mdmag.com/product-news/new-indication-for-adalimumab.
260. Joe Nocera, Drug-Price Transparency Won't End the Patent Games, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
16, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-16/humira-patentsshow-why-fda-s-drug-price-shaming-won-t-work.
261. AHIP, supra note 171, at 7.
262. Id.
263.

Nicholas Huntington, Weekly Dose: Keytruda May Be a Miracle Cancer Drug, but can

Those Who Need It Afford It?, CONVERSATION (Apr. 11, 2018, 3:39 AM),
https://theconversation.com/weekly-dose-keytruda-may-be-a-miracle-cancer-drug-but-can-thosewho-need-it-afford-it-74757. Specifically, Keytruda works as an immunotherapy drug, meaning it
increases the patient's own immune response to the cancer. Id.

264. Gregory J. Glover, How Drug Companies Get Multiple Exclusivity Periodsfor One
Orphan Indication, PHARM. L. GRP. (July 19, 2019), https://www.pharmalawgrp.com/blog/5/how-

drug-companies-get-multiple-exclusivity-periods-for-1-orphan-indication. Currently, Merck & Co.
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administered every three weeks.216 Typically, treatments of Keytruda
last up to twenty-four months in patients without disease progression. 2
In 2018, Keytruda was the third top-selling drug in the world, with
global sales totaling $7.3 billion just four short years after it was
originally designated as an orphan drug in 2014.267
Orphan drugs have seen a four-fold increase in their share of all
new drug approvals from 1988 to 2017.268 Drug launch prices across the
board continue to increase year after year.2 69 While the average drug
costs for traditional and specialty drugs have doubled in this twenty-year
period, the average costs for orphan drugs have grown far more
exponentially.2 70
The big pharmaceutical companies proffer a seemingly compelling
justification for high orphan drug prices: low prices will not permit the
company to recoup its research and development costs due to the small
patient populations the orphan drugs are meant to treat.2 71 At a 2019
congressional hearing, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon noted that drug
prices are higher in the United States than in other developed countries,
including France and Germany. 272 In response, Richard Gonzalez, CEO
of AbbVie, admitted that while the company still turns a profit in other
countries, despite European patients paying less for Humira than
American patients, AbbVie is dependent on this variety of pricing to
2 73
support its research and development model.
This justification is questionable at best.2 74 According to a 2015
study, the fifteen drug companies that made the top twenty best-selling
has exclusivity over Keytruda through 2024 for Hodgkin lymphoma and gastric cancer; 2025 for
primary mediastinal B cell lymphoma, hepatocellular carcinoma, and Markel cell carcinoma; and
2026 for Stage IIB through IV malignant melanoma. The exclusivity end date for metastatic small
cell lung cancer is to be determined. Id.
265. Cost Info & Financial Help, KEYTRUDA, https://www.keytruda.com/fmancial-support
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021). In 2014, Keytruda's launch price was $12,500 per patient per month, or
$150,000 per year. See Arlene Weintraub, Updated: Merck's Melanoma 'Game-Changer'Keytruda

Likely to Bolster Drug Pricing Debate, FIERCE PHARMA (Sept. 5, 2014, 10:07 AM),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/updated-merck-s-melanoma-game-changer-keytruda-likelyto-bolster-drug-pricing-debate. When Keytruda was originally approved, it was hailed as a "game
changer." Id. Roger Perlmutter, president of Merck Research Laboratories, stated that the company
factored in the cost of developing the drug when setting its list price. Id.
266. Huntington, supra note 263.
267. AHIP, supra note 171, at 7.
268. Id. at 4.
269. Id. at 3.
270. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
271. Id. at 7.
272. Drug Pricing in America: A Prescriptionfor Change, Part II: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 11120 (2019).
273. Id.
274. See Rachel Z. Arndt, High U.S. Drug Prices Cannot Be Explained by R&D Spending
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drugs globally brought in $116 billion in excess revenue from drug
prices in the United States, despite spending $76 billion dollars on
global research and development. 275 If those companies lowered their
prices in the United States so that they were proportional to the cost of
research and development, American patients, businesses, and taxpayers
would have saved about $40 billion dollars that year.2 76

AbbVie CEO Gonzalez also testified that AbbVie "spend[s] $5.2
billion dollars" on research and development and "make[s] $5.6 billion
dollars in earnings. So [its research and development costs are] almost
equivalent to what [its] earnings are." 277 In a report to Congress,
however, the Department of HHS found that average development costs
for an orphan drug are approximately $1 billion, compared to an
estimated $2.6 billion for a mass-market drug.2 78 Thus, the question still
remains: Why are orphan drugs priced astronomically higher than
mass-market drugs? 2 79
IV.

CHANGING THE RULES: AMENDMENTS TO DECREASE PRICES AND
INCREASE COMPETITION

At the same 2019 congressional hearings to address drug prices, the
CEO of pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, Pascal Soriot, called for
increased government regulation, stating "[t]he government has to step
up and change the rules." 280 Due to the extensive abuse of the current
legislation, congressional leaders should take control over the ODA and
restore it to its original purpose.2 81
First, this Part argues that the FDA should refuse to grant orphan
drug designation and exclusivity to a drug that is the same as an

AM),
12:00
2017,
7,
(Mar.
HEALTHCARE
MODERN
Alone,
https://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20170307/NEWS/170309919/high-u-s-drug-pricescannot-be-explained-by-r-d-spending-alone.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277.

Drug Pricing in America: A Prescriptionfor Change, Part II: Hearing Before the S.

Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. III, 21 (2019).
278. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: INNOVATION, SPENDING,
AND PATIENT ACCESS 25 (2016).

279. See Radcliff, supra note 57; see also Joshua Cohen, Drug Pricing Should Reflect Value,
Not
Recoupment
of
Investment,
FORBES
(June
20,
2019,
9:33
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2019/06/20/drug-pricing-should-reflect-value-notrecoupment-of-investment/?sh=le257811680c (arguing that high drug prices should "relate to
meaningful clinical advantages over current existing standards of care," rather than the cost that

went into developing them).
280.

Drug Pricing in America: A Prescriptionfor Change, Part H: Hearing Before the S.

Comm. on Fin., 116th Cong. 111 61 (2019).
281. See infra Part Iv.A-C.
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already-approved drug on the market, even if the new drug is clinically
superior to the already-approved drug. 282 Next, it argues that the FDA
should refuse to grant orphan drug designation and exclusivity to a drug
for different uses and, instead, orphan drug designation should only be
available once to a particular drug.283 It also proposes an amendment that
will permit market exclusivity until the sales of the orphan drug reach a
set dollar threshold, or the company recoups its costs for the research
and development of the drug, rather than the seven years currently
authorized by statute. 284 Finally, this Part argues for revocation of
market exclusivity should an orphan drug treat a population in excess of

200,000 individuals. 285
A.

Limitations on Orphan Drug Designation

The current ODA permits a pharmaceutical company to request
orphan designation and exclusivity for a drug that is the same as one
already on the market, so long as the subsequent drug is clinically
superior.2 86 This practice contravenes the original purpose of the ODA:
to encourage innovative research and development to produce treatments
for rare diseases and conditions. 2 87
Section 360cc(c) and its enforcing regulation, which requires
clinical superiority in order for the same drug to be approved for market
exclusivity, should be repealed. 288 Permitting drug companies to tweak
existing drugs just enough to satisfy the requirement of clinical
superiority, and thus obtain exclusive marketing rights over such drugs
and charge astronomical prices, is not the innovation the ODA was
designed to encourage. 289 Should a drug company wish to provide an
advanced version of an already-existing, approved drug, the drug
company is free to do so; however, it should not be able to engage in
anticompetitive practices and increase drug prices ten-fold. 290 This type
of arbitrary and unpredictable inflation is not sustainable and is not in
line with American capitalism. 291 Instead, a drug company that improves
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See infra Part [V.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See supra Part HI.A.
waddill, supra note 47.
21 U.S.C. § 360cc(c).
Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 247.

290.

See Erin Fox, How Pharma Companies Game the System to Keep Drugs Expensive,

HARV. Bus. REv. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-pharma-companies-game-the-systemto-keep-drugs-expensive.
291. Id.
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upon an already-existing drug should intelligently market the drug as an
improved version of an already-existing drug. 2 92 In other words, there
should be competition. 2 93
In addition to repealing Section 360cc(c), the following provision is
necessary to stop the ongoing abuses of the ODA at the hands of
pharmaceutical giants 294.:
If a sponsor of a drug that is designated under section 360bb of this
title and is otherwise the same, as determined by the Secretary, as an
already-approved or licensed drug is seeking exclusive approval or
licensure described in subsection (a) for the same rare disease or
condition as the already-approved drug, the Secretary shall deny such
approval or licensure. 295

This amendment will first prevent drug companies, like Depomed,
Inc. and Eagle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., from taking advantage of the ODA
prior to the FDARA. 2 96 Second, this amendment will create competition
among drug companies who seek to improve upon existing drugs in
order to obtain orphan drug exclusivity. 297 Instead of an opportunity to
engage in anticompetitive practices, drug companies are forced, under
this proposed provision, to drive down prices, therefore benefitting the
millions of sick Americans for whom the ODA was originally designed
to help.298 Additionally, this amendment may encourage pharmaceutical
companies to put time, effort, and resources into treatments waiting to be
developed, as was the original intent of the ODA, instead of expending
costs and research on already-approved drugs. 2 99
Further, the ODA permits drug manufacturers to stack incentives,
thereby exponentially increasing market exclusivity for decades, with
just a single product."' This endless exclusivity can be easily prohibited
through regulatory action. 301 To resolve this issue, the FDA should
292. See Michael Kades, To Combat Rising U.S. Prescription Drug Prices, Let's Try
Competition, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUtTABLE GROWTH (Mar. 5, 2019), https://equitablegrowth.org/tocombat-rising-u-s-prescription-drug-prices-lets-try-competition.
293. Id.
294. See infra text accompanying note 295.
295. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (serving as an amended model as part of the solution to this Note).
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See Kades, supra note 292.
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. See generally Joshua M. Liao & Mark Pauly, Orphan Drugs: Pursuing Value and
Avoiding Unintended Effects
of Regulations, HEALTH AFFS.
(May 4, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170504.059899/full (exploring the connection
between government regulation and drug company output).
300. See supra Part III.B.
301. See generally 21 C.F.R § 316.31 (2020) (offering no current provision that prohibits this
practice).
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amend the regulation to bar drug manufacturers from obtaining
successive exclusivity periods for the same drug in order to treat
different indications or uses.3 02 Specifically, the regulation should permit
the FDA to grant orphan drug designation one single time for one
particular drug, even if the sponsor contends it is being used to treat a
different rare disease than the one the drug was already approved to
treat. 303 This, too, will increase competition in the market and drive
down drug prices since a company will be unable to submit the same
drug for orphan designation multiple times under the guise of several
3
different uses, therefore preventing serial exclusivity. 4
B.

Revocation of OrphanDrug Designation and Market Exclusivity
Based on DrugProfits

In order to further protect American consumers, the ODA and its
regulations should be amended to include a provision permitting the
FDA to revoke orphan drug designation, and thus market exclusivity,
when an orphan drug's profit either (1) reaches a certain dollar
threshold, or (2) equals the amount the sponsor spent on the research and
development of said drug. 305
Similar to a 1992 congressional proposal, automatically revoking
market exclusivity once a drug's total sales exceed a set dollar amount
will limit abuse of the ODA.3 06 Obviously, the drug could and would
still be sold; however, it would not allow big pharmaceutical

302. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(b) (serving as an amended model as part of the solution to this
Note).
303. See id.
304. See supra Part III.B.
305. See infra Part IV.B.
306. See 138 Cong. Rec. 9194 (1992) (setting forth Rep. Henry A. Waxman's proposal to
withdraw a drug's market exclusivity if its total sales exceed $200 million, unless research costs are
greater than sales). Waxman noted this proposal would "allow for competition in these important
markets which should lower the prices of these drugs." Id. "The resulting benefits," he continued,
"will flow to consumers, the Federal Government, and other institutions that purchase drugs." Id.
The limit would have allowed a drug to turn profits of $25 million to $30 million annually for seven
years and rank among the top global sellers, but after a period of such monopoly, the limit would
allow for competition. Philip J. Hilts, Seeking Limits to a Drug Monopoly, N.Y. TtMEs, May 14,
1992, at D1. The bill was introduced in the Senate in 1992, but it did not receive a vote. S. 2060
Amendments
of
1992,
GovTRACK,
(102d):
Orphan
Drug
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/s2060 (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). Additionally, it is
worthwhile to note that at a March 1992 hearing, then FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler
testified that "the [Bush] Administration strongly opposes" the bill and "the Secretary would
recommend that it be vetoed" because the bill "would undermine the [ODA's] primary incentives."
Orphan Drug Amendments of 1991: Hearingon S. 2060 Before the Comm. on Lab. & Hum. Res.,
102d Cong. 40 (1992) (statement of David A. Kessler).
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manufacturers and their shareholders to hold the market captive. 307 This
would encourage manufacturers to continue to improve the drug and
would allow for competition.3 0s
This proposal is particularly appropriate since one study found that
the clinical costs of orphan drugs were actually lower than the
non-orphan drugs, thus there is currently little to no additional risk to
develop orphan drugs as compared to non-orphan drugs. 309 The study
found that "the capitalized clinical cost per approved orphan drug was
half that of a non-orphan drug."31 0 More specifically, the out-of-pocket
clinical costs per approved orphan drug was $166 million, compared to
$291 million per non-orphan drug.3 11
*Alternatively, if a drug company does not reach the dollar
threshold needed to revoke market exclusivity, the ODA should permit
revocation once a company recoups its losses stemming from research
and development.3 1 2 This answers the contested justification proffered
by the pharmaceutical giants: that low drug prices will not permit the
company to make back the costs of research and development due to the
small populations of potential consumers. 1 3 This alternative is also more
functional than setting a dollar threshold amount due to the inconsistent
costs of developing a drug. 1 4 The cost of research and development
depends mostly on the cost of clinical studies, which can range from $10
million to $2 billion, depending on the drug.3 15 Thus, the regulations
should provide that when a sponsor submits its application for orphan
drug designation, it is required to produce data showing the cost of
research and development of the drug, including any failed clinical
trials.3 16 The regulations should also include a subsection within 21
C.F.R. § 316.29, providing that should the drug sponsor fail to report
307. See Liao & Pauly, supra note 299.
308. Id.
309.

See Mark Terry, Report: Evaluating the Cost-Effectiveness and Controversies of Orphan

Drugs, BIOSPACE (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/report-clinical-costs-fororphan-drugs-lower-than-expected.
310. Id.
311. Id. The study noted, however, that "[flurther research is required to better quantify the
overall costs of drug development and obtain consensus on what cost categories should be included
in such an analysis." Id.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 271-76.
313. See supra text accompanying note 271.
314. See Matthew Herper, The Cost of Developing Drugs Is Insane. That Paper that Says
Otherwise
Is
Insanely
Bad,
FORBES
(Oct.
16,
2017,
10:58
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2017/10/16/the-cost-of-developing-drugs-is-insane-apaper-that-argued-otherwise-was-insanely-bad/?sh-61826e942d45.
315. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 114-24.
316. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 316.20 (2020) (offering no current provision that requires this
information).
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total sales of the orphan drug to the FDA for each fiscal year, or should
the total sales of the drug exceed the cost of research and development
as reported in its initial application for orphan drug designation, the FDA
may revoke a drug's orphan drug designation, thus revoking market
exclusivity."
C. Revocation of OrphanDrug Designationand Market Exclusivity
Based on a Drug'sPatientPopulation
Under the current regulations, a sponsor will receive orphan drug
designation if it meets the requirements of 21 C.F.R. Part 316.318 In
order to limit abuse of the ODA, the regulation should be amended to
permit the FDA to revoke orphan drug designation should the patient
population of the drug exceed 200,000 Americans.3 19 The regulation
currently permits revocation of orphan drug designation in several
instances, however, it specifically states:
Where a drug has been designated as an orphan drug because the
prevalence of a disease or condition ... is under 200,000 in the United
States at the time of designation, its designation will not be revoked on
the ground that the prevalence of the disease or condition (or the target
320
population) becomes more than 200,000 persons.

By measuring what a "rare disease or condition" is based upon the
number of persons affected, the total number of Americans living with a
rare disease is estimated at between 25-30 million, making these
diseases not so rare.3 21 This definition does not take into account that the
number of people affected by a disease may change, or that a drug may
be used to treat a condition it was not originally intended to treat. 32 2
First, the regulation should instead take into account that, despite a
drug qualifying as an orphan, it is not guaranteed that the drug will not
be highly profitable. 323 Some orphan drugs must be administered
chronically and, over time, patients are increasingly reliant on the
317. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 316.29 (offering no current provision that permits this practice).
318. 21 C.F.R. § 316.2.
319. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.29.
320. 21 C.F.R. § 316.29(c). According to the regulation,
FDA may revoke orphan-drug designation for any drug if the agency finds that: (1) [t]he
request for designation contained an untrue statement of material fact; or (2) [t]he
request for designation omitted material information required by this party; or (3) FDA
subsequently finds that the drug in fact had not been eligible for orphan-drug designation
at the time of submission of the request therefor.
21 C.F.R. § 316.29(a).
321. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2).
322. See Dorman, supra note 167.
323. See Rohde, supranote 81, at 130.
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medication to manage long-term conditions, thus creating a large profit
for the pharmaceutical manufacturer. 324 Second, in the case of some
drugs, the original patient population expands dramatically while the
drug is on the market.32 For example, Azidothymidine ("AZT") was the
only approved treatment out of all first-generation treatments for
AIDS. 326 At the time it was originally approved for market exclusivity as
an orphan drug, approximately 50,000 people were afflicted with
full-blown symptoms of AIDS. 27 AZT was later found to be helpful in
treating HIV, which affected more than 600,000 people.3 28 Nonetheless,
AZT still enjoyed market exclusivity. 329
In order to remedy this, the Act should be amended to include a
requirement wherein each drug manufacturer that currently produces and
markets a product with orphan drug designation must provide the FDA
with an annual report detailing any changes in the patient population of
the disease the drug is designed to treat. 33 0 Additionally, if the FDA
finds that the patient population exceeds 200,000 people, or that the drug
is being used to treat other diseases with a patient population in excess
of 200,000 people, the FDA should be allowed to immediately revoke
orphan drug designation, and thus revoke market exclusivity. 33' With the
free and unrestricted ability to revoke orphan drug status should the
patient population exceed 200,000 individuals, and thereby the ability to
revoke a grant of market exclusivity, the FDA would be able to foster
competition and decrease the number of pharmaceutical manufacturers
abusing the Act's incentives. 332 This would be consistent with the Act's
original purpose: to encourage drug manufacturers to develop drugs and

324. See Abbey Meller & Hauwa Ahmed, How Big Pharma Reaps Profits While Hurting
Everyday Americans, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2019, 9:03 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/08/30/473911/big-pharma-reaps-

profits-hurting-everyday-americans.
325. See Marlene Cimons & Victor F. Zonana, Manufacturer Reduces Price of AZT by 20%,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1989, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-09-19-mn111-story.html.
326. Id.
327. Id.; Rohde, supra note 81, at 135.
328. Rohde, supra note 81, at 135.
329. See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What's Right with It, 15 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 323-24 (1999).
330. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.29 (2020) (displaying the absence of this requirement in the current
law).
331. Id.
332. See Zachary Brennan, FDA to Revoke Orphan Designation for Opioid Addiction Drug
Sublocade, REG. FOCUS (Nov. 8,
2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-

articles/2019/11/fda-revokes-orphan-designation-for-opioid-addictio (citing a rare example where
the FDA opted to lift a drug's exclusivity designation, thus increasing competition, which will likely
result in trickle-down cost savings to the consumer).
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from
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or

conditions.3 3 3
V.

CONCLUSION

The abuse and manipulation of the ODA by greedy and grasping
pharmaceutical manufacturers should be prohibited in the United
States.33 4 The current legislation clearly allows for the continued
exploitation of a law that was originally designed to aid people afflicted
by rare diseases.335 Instead, in cruel irony, millions are afflicted by the
orphan drug designation.336 Drug companies and their shareholders
should not be allowed to corner the market and exploit the pain and
suffering of the millions of Americans who suffer from rare diseases and
conditions, along with the millions more who suffer from everyday
diseases and conditions but pay exorbitant prices for, or go without the
benefit of, the medication they need.337 These results are
unconscionable. 338
By restricting and limiting some of the incentives provided to drug
companies under the Act, the American public can get the medicine it
339
The
needs at lower drug prices through increased competition.
ultimate beneficiaries are the patients-the original and intended
3 40
beneficiaries of the ODA when Congress first passed it.
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